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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court’s intermediate appellate decision 
reversing the magistrate court’s determination that hearsay evidence Chavez sought to 
introduce at his trial for driving under the influence did not meet any exception to the 
rule and was therefore inadmissible. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In its decision on intermediate appeal, the district court set forth the following 
factual background and procedural history: 
This case arises from an incident that occurred at approximately 
1:00 a.m. on January 2, 2015 when the appellant in this case, Gustavo 
Chavez [II] (Chavez), was traveling home from a social gathering where 
he had consumed alcohol. Chavez left the gathering in his truck, but 
claims a friend, Jesus Blancas, agreed to drive Chavez’s truck home for 
him because he had been drinking.  After only traveling a few blocks, 
Chavez’s truck slid off the road. Chavez claims Blancas attempted to drive 
back onto the road, but in addition to sliding off the road the truck had run 
out of gas.  The temperature at that hour was well below freezing, so 
Chavez decided to knock on the door of [a] nearby house to borrow a 
phone.  Chavez claims Blancas decided to walk back to the home they 
had just left, leaving the keys with Chavez. 
 
Chavez ended up knocking on the door of Jeffrey Long (Long), who 
was an officer for the Bureau of Land Management.  Long answered the 
door and immediately invited Chavez inside because of the frigid 
temperatures.  Chavez told Long that his truck had slid off the road and 
asked if he could use Long’s phone. Long agreed and gave Chavez his 
cell phone.  Long testified at trial that Chavez’s eyes were blood shot, his 
speech was slurred, and he smelled of alcohol.  Additionally, Long testified 
that Chavez used his cell phone to call a close friend or family member 
and informed them they better hurry and come get him because, “if the 
police showed up, he’d be in a lot of trouble.”  Based on these facts, Long 
believed Chavez had been driving under the influence and called the 
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Idaho Falls Police Department from another room in the house.  Long’s 
son, Timothy, was present during these events and also testified that 
Chavez expressed that he would be in trouble if police arrived. 
 
After Long returned from making the call to the police, Chavez 
attempted to leave.  Long informed Chavez that he was a federal officer 
for the Bureau of Land Management, and Chavez was being detained until 
police arrived.  A few minutes later a police officer arrived and confirmed 
the physical signs that Chavez was intoxicated.  The officers also took the 
keys from Chavez and attempted to start his truck, but could not because 
it was in fact out of gas.  There were no signs of Blancas.  The officers 




The state charged Chavez with driving under the influence.  (R., pp.77-78.)  
Chavez pleaded not guilty and the case went to trial.  (R., p.10; Tr., pp.6-177.)  While 
there is some indication that Chavez intended to call Blancas as a witness (see 
R., p.120), Blancas did not appear as a witness at the trial.  Chavez instead sought to 
enter the transcript of Blancas’s testimony from Chavez’s Administrative License 
Suspension (ALS) hearing as testimony from an unavailable witness.  (R., p.120; 
Tr., p.10, L.23 – p.11, L.21.)  Finding that the transcript was hearsay and no exception 
applied, the magistrate court excluded the ALS hearing transcript.  (R., p.120; Tr., p.14, 
Ls.3-14.)  Chavez then requested that he be allowed to testify that Blancas was at the 
ALS hearing.  (R., p.120; Tr., p.14, L.17 – p.15, L.16.)  Recognizing, however, that any 
mention of Blancas at the ALS hearing would just be a backdoor approach to introduce 
Blancas’s testimony, the magistrate court precluded Chavez from testifying that Blancas 
attended the ALS hearing.  (R., pp.120-21; Tr., p.15, L.22 – p.16, L.5.) 
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Notwithstanding the trial court’s rulings, during cross-examination, Chavez 
testified that Blancas had previously testified under oath that Blancas had been driving.  
(R., p.121; Tr., p.142, L.21 – p.143, L.1.)  The state objected and moved to strike, and 
the district court granted the motion.  (R., p.121; Tr., p.143, Ls.2-10).  However, the 
exchange apparently caused some confusion for the jury because, during deliberations, 
the jury sent a note “asking if they could be provided with [Blancas’s] testimony.” 
(Tr., p.166, Ls.15-21.)  The magistrate court attempted to resolve the confusion with a 
pair of instructions, reminding the jurors to only consider the testimony given at trial and 
that the statement regarding Blancas’s alleged testimony had been stricken from the 
record and was not to be considered.  (R., p.121; Tr., p.166, L.15 – p.170, L.10.) 
The jury convicted Chavez of driving under the influence (R., pp.80, 122; 
Tr., p.170, L.24 – p.172, L.5) and he appealed to the district court (R., pp.93-96).  The 
district court reversed the trial court and remanded the case, holding that (1) Blancas’s 
ALS testimony, though hearsay, fell under the exception of prior sworn testimony of an 
unavailable witness because the hearing officer had the opportunity to question 
Blancas; and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it precluded Chavez from 
testifying that Blancas appeared at his ALS hearing.  (R., pp.118-30.) 




1. Did the district court err on intermediate appeal when it reversed the magistrate 
court’s ruling excluding inadmissible hearsay from Chavez’s criminal trial? 
 
2. Did the district court err on intermediate appeal when it reversed the magistrate 
court’s ruling precluding Chavez from testifying that he had previously heard Blancas 






The District Court Erred On Intermediate Appeal When It Reversed The Magistrate 
Court’s Ruling Excluding Inadmissible Hearsay From Chavez’s Criminal Trial 
 
A. Introduction 
At trial, Chavez’s defense to driving under the influence was based on the theory 
that it was his friend, Jesus Blancas, and not him who was driving.  To support this 
theory, Chavez sought to admit as an exhibit the transcript of Blancas’s testimony from 
Chavez’s Administrative License Suspension hearing.  (R., p.120.)  Determining that the 
ALS hearing transcript was hearsay and that no exception applied, the magistrate court 
granted the state’s motion in limine and excluded the exhibit.  (Id.)  On intermediate 
appeal, the district court concluded that Blancas’s testimony met the requirements of 
prior testimony from an unavailable witness and the ALS transcript, therefore, should 
have been admitted.  (R., pp.124-27.)  Application of the correct legal standards to the 
facts of this case, however, shows that the district court erred in that conclusion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate 
capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision.”  State v. 
DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser v. 
Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2005)).  “Trial courts have broad discretion 
when ruling on a motion in limine so we review the [trial] court’s decision to grant or 
deny a motion in limine for abuse of discretion.”  State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 
527-28, 328 P.3d 504, 507-08 (2014) (citations omitted). 
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C. Because The State Never Had The Opportunity To Cross-Examine Blancas At 
The ALS Hearing, His Testimony Was Hearsay And No Exception Applied 
 
As noted above, the magistrate court excluded the ALS hearing transcript 
because it was hearsay and no exception applied.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.3-14.)  Hearsay “is a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  I.R.E. 801.  Generally, 
hearsay is inadmissible, I.R.E. 802, though this is subject to some exceptions.  One 
such exception is prior testimony from an unavailable witness.  I.R.E. 804(b)(1).  The 
district court concluded on intermediate appeal that Blancas’s testimony at the ALS 
hearing met the requirements for admission under this exception.  (R., pp.124-27.)  It 
did not. 
For Blancas’s former testimony to be admissible under Rule 804(b)(1), Chavez 
was required to show (1) that Blancas was unavailable and (2) that his testimony was 
“given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding” and “the 
party against whom the testimony is now offered … had an opportunity and similar 
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.”  To establish 
that Blancas was unavailable, Chavez had the burden of showing that Blancas was 
“absent from the hearing” and that Chavez had “been unable to procure the declarant’s 
attendance … by process or other reasonable means.”  I.R.E. 804(a)(5).  It appears the 
state did not contest this issue below (see Tr., p.11, Ls.11-21), and Chavez did present 
at least some evidence that he had made efforts to “procure [Blancas’s] attendance,” 
but was unable to do so (see Tr., p.140, L.17 – p.141, L.18).  Assuming, therefore, that 
Blancas was unavailable to testify at trial, that is still not enough for the hearsay 
exception to apply; Chavez was required to show that “the party against whom the 
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testimony is now offered … had an opportunity” to cross-examine Blancas.  Contrary to 
the district court’s conclusion on intermediate appeal, Chavez did not meet that burden 
because the state had no opportunity to cross-examine Blancas at the ALS hearing.   
Administrative hearings on license suspensions, or ALS hearings, are conducted 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7).  These proceedings are not adversarial but, as 
the name suggests, are administrative.  The hearings are held at the written request of 
the person whose license has been suspended pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002A.  
I.C. § 18-8002A(7).  The state is not a party to ALS proceedings and, while “[w]ritten 
notice of the date and time of the hearing shall be sent to the party requesting the 
hearing,” the state receives no notice of the hearings.  Id.  Though the statement of the 
arresting officer is automatically admitted, even the arresting officer is not required to 
participate in the administrative hearing “unless directed to do so by a subpoena issued 
by the hearing officer.”  Id.  The burden of proof, a preponderance of the evidence, rests 
solely on the person requesting the hearing.  Id.  And the ALS hearing plays no role in 
subsequent criminal proceedings; rather, “[t]he facts as found by the hearing officer 
shall be independent of the determination of the same or similar facts in the adjudication 
of any criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence.”  Id. 
The district court on intermediate appeal determined that the state had an 
opportunity to cross-examine Blancas because “there is no question the hearing officer 
had such an opportunity.”  (R., p.125 (emphasis added).)  The district court went on to 
explain that “the hearing officer was a representative of the state in the same manner as 
a prosecutor in a criminal case.”  (Id.)  This was error.  There is no basis for concluding 
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that the hearing officer represents the state at all, much less “in the same manner as a 
prosecutor in a criminal case.”  To the contrary,  
“hearing officer” means a person designated by the [Idaho Transportation 
Department] to conduct administrative hearings.  The hearing officer shall 
have authority to administer oaths, examine witnesses and take testimony, 
receive relevant evidence, issue subpoenas, regulate the course and 
conduct of the hearing and make a final ruling on the issues before him. 
 
I.C. § 18-8002A(1)(a).  The hearing officer is the equivalent of an administrative law 
judge, not a prosecutor.   
The hearing officer’s role as an administrative law judge is further reinforced by 
the Rules Governing Administrative License Suspensions, IDAPA 39.02.72.  Under 
these rules, the hearing officer “may, upon written request, issue subpoenas requiring 
the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary or tangible evidence at a 
hearing.”  IDAPA 39.02.72.300.01.  The hearing officer must also “make Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order either sustaining or vacating the license 
suspension in question.  The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order shall be 
the final order of the Department,” shall be issued “following the hearing,” and must be 
sent to the petitioner and his or her attorney.  IDAPA 39.02.72.600.  Thus, the hearing 
officer’s function, as an administrative law judge, is substantially similar to that of the 
court in a civil proceeding.  See, e.g., I.R.C.P. 45 (subpoenas), 52 (findings of fact and 
conclusions of law). 
Moreover, contrary to the erroneous conclusions of the district court, that the 
hearing officer may ask questions of the witnesses is of no consequence.  When acting 
as fact-finders, judges may call and question witnesses.  I.R.E. 614.  Those questions, 
however, do not constitute cross-examination; much less do they show an opportunity 
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for cross-examination by “the party against whom the testimony is now offered.”  The 
district court erred when it determined otherwise.  Because the state never had the 
opportunity to cross-examine Blancas at the ALS hearing, Chavez failed to show that 
the exception for former testimony applied.  Blancas’s testimony from the ALS hearing 
was hearsay, and the magistrate court properly excluded it.  The district court’s ruling on 
intermediate appeal to the contrary is in error and should be reversed. 
 
II. 
The District Court Erred On Intermediate Appeal When It Reversed The Magistrate 
Court’s Ruling Precluding Chavez From Testifying That He Had Previously Heard 
Blancas Testify At The ALS Hearing 
 
A. Introduction 
After the magistrate court correctly excluded the ALS hearing transcript on 
hearsay grounds, Chavez asked a clarifying question: Whether exclusion of the hearsay 
also meant he was precluded from testifying that he had heard Blancas testify at the 
hearing, as long as he did not talk about the substance of the testimony.  (Tr., p.14, L.17 
– p.15, L.21.)  The magistrate court determined that, while Chavez could certainly testify 
and present evidence that Blancas was the driver, testifying that Blancas had appeared 
telephonically and testified at the ALS hearing would only be a backdoor to getting the 
substance of Blancas’s testimony (which was hearsay) in at trial, and so precluded it.  
(Tr., p.15, L.22 – p.16, L.20.)  On intermediate appeal, the district court concluded that 
the magistrate abused its discretion when it precluded Chavez from testifying that he 
had heard Blancas testify at the hearing.  (R., pp.127-30.)  Application of the correct 
legal standards to the facts of this case, however, shows either no abuse of the 
magistrate court’s discretion, or at least no reversible error. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate 
capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s decision.”  State v. 
DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser v. 
Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2005)).  “This Court freely reviews the 
question of relevancy as an issue of law.”  State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667, 
227 P.3d 918, 921 (2010).  Once relevance has been established, the trial court’s 
determination that the evidence’s probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 603, 809 P.2d 
455, 464 (1991). 
 
C. The District Court Properly Precluded Chavez From Testifying That Blancas 
Appeared Telephonically At His ALS Hearing 
 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  
Central to Chavez’s defense was his theory that his friend, Blancas, had been driving 
the car when Chavez was intoxicated and the car slid off the road.  (See Tr., p.24, L.12 
– p.25, L.12; p.111, L.22 – p.112, L.18; p.124, L.10 – p.125, L.3; p.160, L.7 – p.161, 
L.5.)  That Blancas had previously testified (albeit telephonically) at an ALS hearing that 
he was the driver of the car would be relevant to this issue.  However, the magistrate 
court properly excluded that evidence on hearsay grounds.  (See Arg. I.)  Because it 
was hearsay, Chavez could not testify concerning the substance of Blancas’s testimony. 
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Instead, as noted by the district court, “Chavez claimed that any testimony 
concerning Blancas would be to show the jury that Blancas actually existed, and was 
not part of a made up story by Chavez.”  (R., p.129.)  Though not as relevant to 
Chavez’s case as whether Blancas was behind the wheel, that Blancas in fact existed is 
an issue of at least some relevance to Chavez’s case.1  And considerable testimony, 
which supported Blancas’s existence, was properly admitted during the trial:  Chavez 
testified that his friend, Jesus Blancas, attended the same party he was at around New 
Years and agreed to drive him home (Tr., p.111, L.22 – p.112, L.8); he also testified that 
he had known Blancas for “20 plus years” (Tr., p.119, Ls.18-22); another defense 
witness affirmed that he saw Blancas drive Chavez home from the party, and later saw 
Blancas return (Tr., p.124, L.16 – p.125, L.5); this witness had known Blancas, through 
Chavez, for two years (Tr., p.129, Ls.20-23); and Chavez’s wife testified that she later 
took Blancas, whom she previously knew, from the party to look for her missing 
husband (Tr., p.135, L.23 – p.136, L.13).  In light of this evidence, Chavez also testifying 
that on a certain date he heard Blancas’s voice on a phone call (which is the most he 
could say without back-dooring Blancas’s testimony from the ALS hearing) does not 
make the fact that Blancas existed any more probable than the rest of the evidence 
Chavez properly presented. 
Considering the ample testimony offered by Chavez affirming that Blancas 
existed, Chavez also testifying that he heard Blancas’s voice on the telephone at a prior 
                                            
1  Of course, that Blancas was a real person who existed was never actually contested.  
The state certainly disputed that Blancas was driving the car when Chavez was 
intoxicated and his car slid off the road and questioned whether Blancas was even 
present when the car slid off the road (Tr., p.67, L.25 – p.68, L.22; p.69, L.17 – p.71, 
L.12; p.104, Ls.8-14; p.154, Ls.15-17; p.163, L.22 – p.164, L.10), but not that Blancas 
was a real person who in fact existed. 
12 
hearing—without any mention of what Blancas was doing on the phone and certainly 
nothing concerning the substance of what Blancas said—does not make Blancas’s 
existence more likely than it already was.  The jury already heard testimony from 
Chavez and other witnesses that Blancas actually existed, and they either believed it or 
they did not.  Cumulative testimony from Chavez that Blancas actually existed would not 
affect that credibility determination and so is not relevant. 
 
D. Even If The Evidence Were Marginally Relevant, It Would Still Be Properly 
Excluded Under Rule 403 
 
Even if evidence that Chavez had heard Blancas’s voice on the phone on a 
specific date were relevant, the magistrate court still properly excluded it.  Under Rule 
403, even relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”  If this evidence had any relevance, it was at most marginally 
relevant, and whatever relevance it may have had was clearly outweighed by other 
considerations relevant to Rule 403.  First, as demonstrated above, it is entirely 
cumulative:  No one disputed that Blancas was a real person, and several witnesses, 
including Chavez, testified to his existence.  Second, as demonstrated by the actual 
proceedings of this case, the evidence in fact confused the issues and/or misled the 
jury, requiring two curative instructions.  (See Tr., p.166, L.15 – p.170, L.10.)  Third, as 
the magistrate foresaw and the proceedings demonstrated, the testimony only opened 
the door to the hearsay evidence that had been properly excluded.  (See Tr., p.142, L.6 
13 
– p.143, L.9.)  The magistrate court was therefore correct under Rule 403 to preclude 
Chavez from testifying regarding Blancas’s telephonic appearance. 
On intermediate appeal, however, the district court determined that the 
magistrate abused its discretion by failing to conduct the required analysis under Rule 
403.  (R., pp.128-30.)  All Rule 403 requires is that the court balance the probative value 
of the evidence against its potential for harm.  While the magistrate did not explicitly cite 
Rule 403, it implicitly performed the required balancing when it (correctly, in hindsight) 
noted that such testimony would only be used as a backdoor approach to get around 
the trial court’s proper ruling excluding the hearsay, and therefore precluded it.  As 
outlined above, the evidence was at most marginally relevant but carried considerable 
risk of harm.  The magistrate recognized this, and so properly exercised its discretion 
under Rule 403 when it precluded Chavez from testifying that he heard Blancas on the 
phone at the ALS hearing. 
Finally, even if the trial court in fact failed to perform the correct analysis, an 
appellate court may still affirm an ultimately correct ruling by applying the correct legal 
analysis.  Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21 P.3d 895, 901 (2001).  Because proper 
application of Rule 403 shows that the magistrate was correct to preclude this evidence, 
because of its potential prejudice, this Court may still uphold the magistrate court’s 
determination. 
 
E. Even Had The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Precluded Chavez’s 
Testimony, Such Error Would Be Harmless 
 
Moreover, even had the magistrate court abused its discretion by not conducting 
the proper analysis under Rule 403, and this Court could not simply supply the correct 
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analysis, the magistrate’s error would still be harmless under the facts of this case.  The 
standard for determining whether error is harmless is whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the jury’s verdict and “the court must be able to 
declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jones, 125 
Idaho 477, 488, 873 P.2d 122, 133 (1994).  “An error is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt if the Court can conclude, based upon the evidence and argument presented 
during the trial, that the jury would have reached the same result absent the error.”  
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471, 163 P.3d 1175, 1183 (2007).   
First, during his testimony, Chavez (improperly but without objection) in fact 
alluded to Blancas’s appearance at the previous hearing.  (Tr., p.140, Ls.17-23.)  This 
testimony apparently did not impact the verdict.   
Second, as shown above, evidence that Blancas appeared telephonically at a 
hearing for the purpose of showing Blancas’s existence was merely cumulative of 
evidence already presented.  Because the only proper use of Chavez’s testimony that 
he had personally heard Blancas speak on a phone at a hearing was to further show 
that Blancas existed, and because this evidence is merely cumulative of the other 
evidence regarding Blancas’s existence which was properly offered by Chavez, its 
admission would not have impacted the verdict in this case.   
Whether Blancas was driving Chavez’s vehicle when it slid off the road is a 
separate question from whether Blancas was a real person who actually existed.  As 
noted above, the state did not dispute that Blancas actually existed.  This Court can say 
with certainty that cumulative evidence tending to support the (uncontested) conclusion 
that Blancas was in fact a real person who existed (but not whether he was the driver of 
15 
the car) would not have affected the outcome of the trial.  Therefore, if the magistrate 
erred when it precluded Chavez from offering this cumulative evidence supporting the 
existence of Blancas, such error was harmless. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the intermediate appellate 
decision of the district court and affirm Chavez’s conviction. 
 DATED this 7th day of April, 2017. 
 
 
      __/s/ Russell J. Spencer_______ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
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